US Supreme Court Cowboys for Trump Founder, Couy Griffin 14th Amendment Removal Petition for Reversal Update

The case is proceeding before the US Supreme Court Docket Number No. 23-279 concerning the removal from political office, and the ban from ever holding political office of Cowboys for Trump Founder, Couy Griffin. The case is referenced as Couy Griffin, Petitioner v.
New Mexico, ex rel. Marco White, et al. and is an appeal of the decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court who declined to hear the appeal and allow the judgement under the 14th Amendment interpretation to remain intact. The decision was rendered on November 15th, 2022. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied a rehearing on February 16th, 2023.

On May 17th, 2023, Griffin's attorneys filed a petition for a writ of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court with a response due October 23, 2023. On November 30th, 2023, a letter was submitted to the respondents that read...

The petition for a writ of certiorari in this case was filed on May 17, 2023, with a response due by October 23, 2023. On September 22, 2023, Respondents waived their right to respond. On
November 14, 2023, a response was requested, with a due date of December 14, 2023.
Pursuant to Rule 30.4 of the Rules of this Court, Respondents hereby respectfully request an extension of time to and including January 16, 2024, within which to file their response.

This extension is requested to complete preparation of Respondents’ response brief. I have
recently been retained as counsel of record for Respondents and require time to familiarize myself with the issues and proceedings below. In addition, my co-counsel and I face a heavy press of cases over the coming month, with numerous court-ordered deadlines in other matters. - Joshua Matz, Counsel for Respondents.

A further extension was requested by  Joshua Matz, Counsel for the Respondent and granted for January 16th, 2024.

The response filed claims...

The Court lacks jurisdiction over this case and should deny the Petition. Petitioner seeks review of “the State of New Mexico, County of Santa Fe, First Judicial District Court’s decision in this case.” Pet. 1. But this Court has jurisdiction to review state court rulings only if they were rendered by “the highest court of [the] State in which a decision could be had.” 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). Here, a decision could have been had in the New Mexico Supreme Court. It was only by virtue of Petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedural rules that his state court appeal was dismissed. Therefore, under the plain language of § 1257(a), this Court cannot review the state trial court judgment and should deny review. 

Although the Court has recently granted review of a case that also presents questions about Section
Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Trump v. Anderson, No. 23-719, the Court should deny this
petition rather than hold it pending a resolution of that matter. Because of Petitioner’s repeated failure to comply with state procedural rules, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition and thus cannot afford Petitioner any relief at all (including a Munsingwear remedy or a “grant, vacate, and remand” order).

Moreover, Petitioner should not receive a benefit here after he violated state procedures and then filed a jurisdictionally improper petition in an improper bid to undo his state court procedural default.
In all events, the Petition fails to satisfy the traditional criteria for certiorari. This case is an
abysmal vehicle to decide anything. And Petitioner is wrong on the merits.

Additionally, per the brief, NONE OF THE STANDARD CRITERIA
FOR CERTIORARI ARE SATISFIED. Independent of the jurisdictional defects that preclude review, the Petition should also be denied because there is no split in relevant authority, the Petition is a poor vehicle to address any of the legal questions it seeks to present, and (in all events) Petitioner’s position fails on the merits.

There is no split in authority. Petitioner does not identify any split in authority, on any question presented, involving a federal court of appeals or state court of last resort. Moreover, because this very case involves only a state trial court decision, it could not itself create a split worthy of the Court’s attention under the traditional criteria. 

This Case Is a Poor Vehicle. Yet another reason why review should be denied is that this case is a poor vehicle to review any of the questions in the Petition. That is true in two respects. First, because of Petitioner’s failure to comply with the rules of the New Mexico Supreme Court, this case arrives without the ventilation provided by an appellate record. See McGoldrick v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 (1940) 

The State Trial Court Ruling Was Correct. Finally, review should be denied because the state trial court ruling was correct and Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are meritless.

Specific to the 14th Amendment questions the brief asserts: Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment— which says, “Congress shall have the power to enforce” the Amendment—does not provide exclusive federal jurisdiction to enforce Section Three and does not displace state courts’ coordinate duty to do so. Indeed, this Court has already made clear that the Reconstruction Amendments—each of which includes a materially identical enforcement clause—impose
“self-executing” limits that courts have the “power to interpret” even without congressional legislation.

The third question presented is “[w]hether a state court may issue a federal writ quo warranto.” Pet. i.
Petitioner never raised this issue at any stage of the state court proceedings. Nowhere did he argue that he could be enjoined from federal office only in a quo warranto proceeding initiated “by the United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia.” Pet.13. Nor did the state trial court reach this question.

In any event, the proceedings below were based on New Mexico’s quo warranto statute, and did not
involve a federal writ of quo warranto, which extends only to “the removal of federal officials.”

The fourth question presented is whether the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,
constituted an “insurrection” under Section Three. Petitioner insists that the answer is “no,” but his
contention is against the overwhelming weight of historical evidence and precedent.

The January 6 attack was “the most significant assault on the Capitol since the War of 1812.” Trump
v. Thompson, 20 F.4th 10, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1350 (2022). In this case, based on eyewitness and expert testimony, as well as extensive video footage of the attack, Petitioner’s own
statements, and over two hundred exhibits, the trial properly found that the events of January 6 were
an “insurrection.” App. 52a-57a. Specifically, the trial court determined that “the January 6 Attack followed a weeks-long campaign to stop—through extra legal means—certification of the
2020 presidential election and the transfer of power as mandated by federal law.” App. 53a. Participants in this attack “did not hide their objective” to stop the “lawful transfer of power.” Id. 

That leaves only Petitioner’s fifth and sixth questions presented, where Petitioner essentially
contends that the state trial court misapplied First Amendment principles to the facts of his case. Pet. 16-20. Of course, this Court does not customarily grant certiorari to address asserted fact-bound
“misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” S. Ct. Rule 10. It should decline Petitioner’s invitation to engage in that kind of purported error-correction here. Such avoidance is particularly warranted because the trial court’s ruling that Petitioner engaged in “insurrection” under Section Three did not depend solely on a rejection of Petitioner’s First Amendment arguments. The trial court’s ruling was supported by an alternative holding that Petitioner engaged in insurrection through his unlawful trespass on the Capitol on January 6—conduct for which Petitioner was also criminally convicted. App. 60a-61a. In light of this alternative holding, which independently supports the trial court’s ultimate finding, the Court has no reason to review the fifth and sixth questions presented.

The brief in reply for Couy Griffin was submitted on January 30th, 2024. The highlights of the response include:

This Court has jurisdiction over this case, and it should decide the questions below on the 1st Amendment and the 14th Amendment. In the case sub juris, the trial court held that Mr. Griffin is constitutionally ineligible and barred for life from any office under the United States or under
any State under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment. As the state court decided an important question of
federal law which involves both the 1st Amendment and the 14th Amendment, this Court should hear the case. See Rule 10(b) and 10(c).

Each of the Questions Presented for review are novel and consequential; some have been scantly
considered since the mid-19th century but are now more important than ever.

Accordingly, this Court should hold that the trial court has decided important questions of federal law that have not been, and which needs to be settled by this court.

This Court has Jurisdiction to Review the State Trial Court Decision The Presented Questions stem from the Trial Court and the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decisions. Rule 10 of this Court states that in this Court’s discretion, “A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons.” Rule 10 states 6 that a state court decision on an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court is a reason the court should consider. See USCS Supreme Ct R 10

The New Mexico Supreme Court and the Trial Court’s decisions intrude into Federal and
Constitutional territory: Section Five of the 14th Amendment exclusively reserves the power to enforce
the 14th Amendment, by appropriate legislation by Congress. The Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) are satisfied here; the Supreme Court of New Mexico constructively rendered a final judgment in the
underlying case against the Petitioner in its refusal to hear the appeal. The Respondents cited to Gorman v. Wash. Univ., 316 U.S. 98, 100-01 (1942), which became obsolete when Congress made a statutory revision.

This Court Has Jurisdiction Because the State Supreme Court Decisions Do Not Rest on
Independent and Adequate State Law Grounds. Rule 12-604 of the New Mexico Rules of
Appellate Procedure governed the proceeding below for removal of the Petitioner. The proceeding below was to remove a public official and the New Mexico Supreme Court was required by its own statute to 7 hear the appeal, but it did not. See John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 587, 34 S. Ct. 178, 179 (1913). The intentional ignoring of N.M.R. App. P. 12- 604, which fell under the New Mexico Rules of
Appellate Procedure, by the New Mexico Supreme Court was to improperly avoid the issues, including
the issue of a denial of the right to free speech and assembly. This avoidance of an issue constructively
decided the federal questions in the underlying case against the Petitioner. 

THE PETITION SHOULD PROCEED NOTWITHSTANDING TRUMP v. ANDERSON. The Petitioner agrees with the Respondents that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should not be delayed pending review in Trump v. Anderson, No. 23- 719. The case at bar is judicially independent from
Trump, id. The reasons of each side are opposite, lack of jurisdiction vis a vis no lack of jurisdiction, but at least they seem to agree that the case should move forward.

The Split in Authority is a guideline, not a hard rule. Section I(A) of the Petition raised the split
decisions of In re Griffin, 11 F. Cas. 7, (C.C.D. Va. 1869), and Hansen v. Finchem, CV-22-0099-AP/EL,
2022 Ariz. LEXIS 168 (Ariz. May 9, 2022). Hence, there is a split in authority.
However, even if no split of authority existed, one is not needed in this case. Rule 10 of the Supreme
Court is “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion,” Brown v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 14, 16 n.5 (2018). A. 

The State Trial Court Ruling Was Incorrect.

The trial court found that trespassing or the events taking place at the U.S. Capitol on January 6,
2021, “constituted an ‘insurrection’ within the meaning of Section Three of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” App. C at 52a. Yet the trial court relied on the Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800), a case decided over half a century before the ratification of the 14th Amendment. In Fries. Id., the Court recognized that “[t]he true criterion to determine whether acts committed are treason, or a less offence (as a riot), is the quo animo, or the intention, with which the people did assemble,” and further that “[t]he commission of any number of felonies, riots, or other misdemeanours, cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount to treason,” (Emphasis added.) Fries, 9 F. Cas. at 930

The Petitioner was charged with trespassing, not under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2383 governing insurrection.
The Respondents cited cases in their Footnote 10 have wildly varying circumstances, particularly when compared to the case at bar. The very first case mentioned, United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 2021), another case involving January 6, has already been met with caution from another case involving January 6. United States v. Donohoe differentiates the actions of some participants in the January 6 riots to others.

The Supreme Court’s existence revolves around correcting the errors of the lower courts, especially
when those errors infringe on the rights of American Citizens. Here, the Respondent stated that the Petitioner engaged in insurrection through his unlawful trespass on the Capitol on January 6. App. 60a-61a. The Petitioner was not armed, violent, or encouraging violence at the Capitol and the Petitioner never stepped foot inside the Capitol building. The intent of the Petitioner matters, as does the severity of the actions. The bar for engaging in an insurrection is not trespassing on government property; if it were, any sit-in inside or outside of the Capitol could be considered an “insurrection.”

Griffins brief concluded: This Court should determine that the case at bar is judicially independent and should not be delayed pending the outcome of the Trump v. Anderson matter. The instant case could be considered contemporaneously or before Trump v.
Anderson. The Court should hold that there are important questions on statutory and constitutional grounds, with a particular effect on the First and 14th Amendments.

The US Supreme Court shows that the documents will be distributed to conference on February 16th, 2024. 

Source: AlamogordoTownNews.com, US Supreme Court

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